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Abstract: Recent studies found evidence for nominal wage rigidity during periods of 
relatively high nominal GDP growth. It has been argued, however, that in an environment 
with low nominal GDP growth, when nominal wage cuts become customary, workers’ 
opposition to nominal cuts would erode and, hence, firms would no longer hesitate to reduce 
nominal pay. If this argument is valid nominal wage rigidity is largely irrelevant because in a 
high-growth environment there is little need to cut nominal pay while in a low-growth 
environment the necessary cuts would occur.  
To examine this argument we use data from Switzerland where nominal GDP growth has 
been very low for many years in the 1990s. We find that the rigidity of nominal wages is a 
robust phenomenon that does not vanish in a low growth environment. In addition, it 
constitutes a considerable obstacle to real wage adjustments. In the absence of downward 
nominal rigidity, real wages would indeed be quite responsive to unemployment. Moreover, 
the wage sweep-ups caused by nominal rigidity are strongly correlated with unemployment 
suggesting that downward rigidity of nominal wages indeed contributes to unemployment.  
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1. Introduction 
The extent and the nature of downward nominal wage rigidity is likely to have strong 
implications for the functioning of the labor market and for questions of monetary policy. 
There are several reasons why firms may be reluctant to cut nominal wages. Firms may be 
constrained by efficient nominal wage contracts (MacLeod and Malcomson 1993, Holden 
1999), by the existence of nominal loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Genesove 
and Mayer 1998) or by fairness standards (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986, Agell and 
Lundborg 1995, Campbell and Kamlani 1997, Bewley 1999, Fehr and Falk 1999).  
In this paper we examine two important unresolved questions in the empirical literature on 
nominal wage rigidity. First, there is, to our knowledge, no information regarding the rigidity 
of nominal wages in an environment of low nominal GDP growth. This question is important 
because in an environment with high average nominal growth there is little need to cut 
nominal wages and, hence, nominal wage rigidity – if it exists – has probably no big real 
effects. In contrast, in a low-growth environment wage rigidity may well be a binding 
constraint on wage setting for large segments of the work force. Hence, non-negligible real 
effects of nominally rigid wages are much more likely in an environment with low nominal 
GDP growth. However, little is known about the behavior of wages in this situation.  
Second, there is little empirical support for the claim that nominal wage rigidity affects the 
real side of the economy. Yet, such knowledge is important because even if nominal wage 
cuts are frequently inhibited by nominal rigidity, it cannot be taken for granted that this causes 
real effects. The reason is that many labor relations are long-term so that the employer could, 
in principle, smooth the time path of individual wages without affecting the expected marginal 
costs of labor. For example, in a long-run employment relation a worker could pay for the 
absence of wage cuts in this year by lower wage increases in future years such that the present 
value of his labor costs would remain unaffected. From applications of the theory of repeated 
games to long run labor relations it is, however, known that these relations are characterized 
by infinitely many equilibria (MacLeod and Malcolmson 1989). Therefore, it is far from 
obvious that the equilibria with wage smoothing are the relevant ones. Ultimately, it is thus an 
empirical question whether widespread nominal wage rigidity will be associated with real 
effects.  
Due to the lack of data previous studies were forced to examine the existence of nominal 
wage rigidity in an environment with quite large average growth rates of nominal GDP. The 
early studies by McLaughlin (1994) and Lebow, Stockton, and Washer (1995) found little 
  2
evidence. Further studies by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996), Card and Hyslop (1996) and 
Kahn (1997) report more favorable evidence and two recent papers found quite strong 
evidence for downward rigidity (Altonji and Devereux 1999, Lebow, Saks and Wilson 1999). 
However, since all these studies used US data from the last four decades and since nominal 
GDP growth has been quite high during this time period it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
draw reliable inferences about the behavior of nominal wages in a low-growth environment 
from these studies. For example, between 1965 and 1998 there are only 3 years with a 
nominal GDP growth of less than 5 percent in the US. Gordon (1996) and Mankiw (1996) 
have forcefully argued that it is very problematic to infer from the presence of nominal wage 
rigidity in a high-growth environment that wages will also exhibit nominal rigidity in a low-
growth environment. The reason is that the microeconomic behavior of workers and firms 
may well change in response to the change in the macroeconomic environment. "The … 
attempt, to reason from evidence on nominal wage rigidity in an environment of rapid positive 
average nominal wage change to a hypothetical situation of zero average nominal wage 
change is subject to the Lucas critique. If the macroeconomic environment were different, 
microeconomic behavior would be different. Nominal wage reductions would no longer be 
seen as unusual if the average nominal wage was not growing. Workers would not see them as 
unfair, and firms would not shy away from imposing them." (Gordon, 1996, p. 62). If this 
argument is valid there would be little reason to be concerned about nominal wage rigidity 
because in a high-growth environment it is likely to have little impact on employment while 
in a low-growth environment nominal rigidity will be absent.  
The empirical results presented in this paper challenge, however, the above argument. We 
provide evidence for the presence of strong nominal wage rigidity in an environment with 
sustained low nominal growth. Our study is based on the Swiss experience between 1991 and 
1997. During this period Switzerland experienced inflation rates and real GDP growth rates 
close to zero in several consecutive years and in three years real growth was even negative. 
Between 1992 and 1997 nominal GDP growth was always below 2.6 percent. Thus, there was 
plenty of time for individual agents to adjust their behavior to this macroeconomic 
environment. Yet, our results indicate that the low inflation environment reduced the 
reluctance to cut nominal wages by only very little. This decrease was far too small to 
accommodate the greater need for nominal wage cuts when inflation approached zero. 
Therefore, instead of a decrease in the quantitative relevance of nominal wage rigidity we 
even observe an increase over time. For example, in 1991, when nominal GDP growth was 
still 5.2 percent, nominal rigidity prevented wage cuts for one third of the job stayers and the 
average prevented wage decrease for these workers was 2.7 percent. In contrast, in 1997, after 
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5 years of very low nominal growth, the fraction of job stayers who did not receive wage cuts 
due to nominal rigidity was 62 percent and the average prevented wage decrease for these 
workers was 6.5 percent. These results leave little doubt that the rigidity of nominal wages is 
very persistent in these years. Moreover, our results also show that in the absence of nominal 
wage rigidity real wages would be quite flexible. This indicates that nominal wage rigidity is 
an important determinant of real wages in an environment with low nominal GDP-growth.  
In view of this result it is interesting to ask whether nominal wage rigidity is associated with 
important real effects. Previous research has either not dealt explicitly with this question or 
has found no strong effects. At the micro-level Altonji and Devereux (1999) found evidence 
that workers who are protected by a nominal wage floor are less likely to quit. Whether 
nominal rigidity also affects layoffs, promotions, and relative wage growth remains, according 
to these authors, an open question. For the macro-level there seems to be even less evidence. 
To our knowledge, so far there exists no evidence suggesting that nominal wage rigidity is 
associated with higher unemployment. The recent paper by Lebow, Saks and Wilson (1999) 
even poses a so-called micro-macro puzzle. These authors found that despite the large wage 
sweep-ups caused by nominal wage rigidity in the US in the 1980s the unemployment rate 
even decreased in this period. Moreover, the paper reports that the measure of nominal 
rigidity is insignificant in Phillips curve estimates suggesting that nominal rigidity may be 
unimportant at the macro-level. However, in view of our arguments above it could also be the 
case that nominal wage rigidity has only small effects in an environment with relatively high 
nominal growth while it may well cause important real effects in a low-growth environment.  
To examine whether nominal wage rigidity is associated with unemployment we have 
computed the average wage sweep-up caused by nominal rigidity for every canton1 and every 
industry in Switzerland in each year between 1991 and 1997. This enables us to see whether 
the wage increasing effect of nominal rigidity is related to the unemployment rates in the 
different cantons and industries. Our analysis yields a striking result: In every single canton 
and in most industries we observe a positive relation between the unemployment rate and the 
average wage sweep-up caused by nominal rigidity. A plausible interpretation of this result is 
that the wage sweep-ups indeed represent sweep-ups in labor costs, which induce firms to lay 
off workers.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the characteristics of 
the Swiss labor market. Section 3 provides descriptive evidence on wage rigidity from 
                                                 
1 Switzerland is a highly decentralized federation that consists of 26 cantons. The cantons are the primary 
political units comparable to the federal states in the US.  
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personnel files and Section 4 shows descriptive evidence from representative random samples. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical model of wage changes applied in our paper. Section 6 
shows to what extent nominal rigidity persists in our low growth environment and discusses 
the real consequences on unemployment. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Characteristics of the Swiss Labor Market 
The Swiss labor market is one of the least regulated and least unionized labor markets in 
Europe. In Switzerland employers have, for example, the legal possibility to enforce wage 
cuts by proposing a lower nominal wage to incumbent workers. If a worker refuses to accept 
the new wage, the law allows the employer to fire the worker. Due to these characteristics the 
Swiss labor market is perhaps closer to the US labor market than to the labor markets in most 
other European countries. Despite the employers’ opportunities of firing individual workers 
nominal wage rigidity may nevertheless occur if behavioral forces like nominal fairness 
standards and nominal loss aversion are sufficiently strong. For our purposes, the most 
important feature of the Swiss situation is that both inflation and real GDP growth was very 
low in the period under consideration. Between 1991 and 1993 real GDP growth was even 
negative and between 1994 and 1996 real growth was always less than 0.5 percent. Low real 
GDP growth implies that average real wage growth is moderate. Therefore, structural changes 
in the economy are likely to be associated with the necessity to cut the real wages of many 
workers. This downward pressure on the real wages of many workers is translated into 
downward pressure on nominal wages if inflation rates are low. In Switzerland the rate of 
inflation was never above 1.6 percent between 1993 and 1997. This is a very good 
environment for the examination of nominal wage rigidity. The downward pressure on the 
nominal wages of many workers means that firms face a strong temptation to cut the nominal 
wages of these workers, and, consequently, nominal wage cuts should become more 
customary. This, in turn, is the ideal situation to examine whether nominal wage rigidity 
indeed erodes. When, if not in this situation, can we expect an erosion of nominal wage 
rigidity? On the other hand, if nominal rigidity persists, this is the ideal environment for the 
study of the real consequences of nominal rigidity because nominal rigidity prevents many 
real wage cuts.  
It is instructive to compare the macro-environment in this study with the macro-environment 
in previous studies of nominal wage rigidity (see Table 1). In our study the median nominal 
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GDP growth is 2.2 percent during the sample years while in the other studies it varies between 
5.7 percent and 11.3 percent. Moreover, to study the persistence of nominal rigidity in a low 
nominal growth environment it is necessary that nominal growth rates are low in several 
consecutive years. It is unlikely that nominal rigidity erodes just because nominal GDP 
growth drops below, say, 3 percent in a single year. Table 1 shows that previous studies could 
not address this question because – except for the study by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) 
- nominal growth was never below 5.2 percent in two or more consecutive years. In contrast, 
in our sample period it was always below 5.2 percent. Likewise, in all studies, including the 
one by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996), nominal growth was never below 2.6 percent in 
two or more consecutive years while in our study this was the case in 6 consecutive years.2  
 
3. Descriptive Evidence from Personnel Files 
The ideal data set for examining nominal wage rigidity would be a representative sample of 
firms’ personnel files including precise information on wages, individuals’ productivity and 
other individual characteristics. Unfortunately, to our knowledge there is no study with such a 
data set. Although less informative it is still useful to examine non-representative firm-level 
information.3 We obtained personnel records from a large and a medium-sized Swiss firm. 
Firm A is a large firm in the service industry with approximately 10,000 employees. The 
available personnel records cover the period from 1993 to 1999. For both firms wages are 
calculated as total compensation divided by hours in the contract. Average wage growth in 
Firm A was 3.8 percent (s.d.: 5.3 percent). Firm B is a medium-sized firm in the service 
industry with a declining activity in manufacturing. The records of Firm B start in 1984 and 
end in 1999. In this firm employment drops from about 2000 in the 1980s to 1000 in 1998, 
from where it started to rise again4. Wages grew on average by 5.7 percent (s.d.: 5 percent) in 
Firm B.  
Figure 1 displays the distribution of wage changes (measured in log wage differences) in the 
two firms for the periods 1993 – 1999 and 1984 – 1998, respectively. The striking feature of 
                                                 
2 In the Akerlof et al. study nominal GDP growth was 3.9 percent in 1960 and in 1961. Then it rose to 7.5 
percent. Thus this is also not the kind of environment where one would expect nominal rigidities to erode. The 
lowest nominal growth rate in the US between 1960 and 1998 was 3.2 percent in 1991. 
3 Interesting evidence from the personnel files of a large firm is reported in Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994) 
and Wilson (1999).  
4 The reason is that Firm B closed its manufacturing plants, which was accompanied with a large employment 
decrease, many of which were dismissals. 
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both distributions is, that there are almost no wage cuts. In Firm A (N=35,779), only 1.7 
percent of all observations are wage cuts. In Firm B (N=20,236), the fraction is even lower 
(0.4 percent). Both distributions exhibit a discontinuity at zero that could hardly be more 
pronounced. If we restrict our attention to the years with low nominal GDP growth the picture 
is essentially the same. Between 1993 and 1997 average nominal wage growth was also 3.8 
percent in Firm A and the percentage of negative wage changes was 1.5. Firm B experienced 
4.2 percent average nominal wage growth in this period and the percentage of wage cuts was 
again 0.4 percent. Therefore, irrespective of the period considered nominal wage cuts are 
extremely rare in these firms. These data are, thus, certainly consistent with the view that 
employers are reluctant to cut nominal wages. Yet, it is unclear to what extent the wage 
change regularities in these firms are representative for the whole economy.  
 
4. Descriptive Evidence from Representative Samples 
To get representative information on the extent of nominal rigidity we examine two large data 
sets. The first data source is the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) for the years 1991 – 1998. 
The SLFS is a rotating panel that follows individuals for five years. In total, the SLFS 
provides 21,144 wage change observations. The second data source is a large random sample 
from the Social Insurance Files (SIF). The SIF contains information about all employees in 
Switzerland. This sample gives us 140,628 observations of wage changes and covers 
essentially the same time period as the SLFS-data5. The major advantage of examining both 
data sets is that this provides a very useful robustness check of our results. Below we will 
show that both data sources have their specific advantages and disadvantages. Hence, if both 
data sources nevertheless lead to similar results we can be more confident that the results are 
robust. 
In both data sources we consider non-self employed individuals who stayed with the same 
firm for at least one year. We call these individuals “job stayers”. We trimmed both samples 
by excluding all observations with an absolute wage change above 50 percent. This is 
motivated by the concern that for job stayers wage changes exceeding 50 percent are utterly 
implausible. In both data sets we lose approximately 3 percent of the observations when we 
apply this criterion. However all our conclusions remain qualitatively identical and 
                                                 
5 The Social Insurance Files are December to December data, while the SLFS is conducted in May. Hence, 
referring to wage changes in e.g. 1993, we mean wage changes between May 1993 and May 1994 for the SLFS 
and wage changes between December 1992 and December 1993 for the SIF. 
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quantitatively very similar if we use the whole sample for our estimates. For the SLFS-data 
our measure of wages is total compensation (net of social security contributions) divided by 
hours specified in the labor contract. For the SIF-sample we use a different measure of wages 
as discussed below.  
The advantage of the SLFS is that it provides extensive information on the characteristics of 
individuals like, e.g., tenure, labor market experience, education levels, gender, age, 
nationality, etc. The disadvantage is that surveys are likely to be distorted by reporting errors. 
The advantage of the SIF-data is that all financial transactions between firms and workers are 
recorded in the Social Insurance Files. Hence, reporting error is not an issue. The earnings 
information obtained from the SIF is accurate. In addition, the SIF-sample is comfortably 
large. Since the SIF data covers the same period of time as the SLFS-data, we can replicate 
the empirical analysis we conduct with the SLFS. We should also mention that the SIF-data 
have three problems. First, it is impossible to identify job stayers with absolute certainty. We 
only consider those workers in the SIF-sample who were insured by the same local social 
insurance agency in two consecutive years since these are most likely to be job stayers. 
However, if a worker moves to another employer, but both employers are associated with the 
same local agency, the individual may still be included in our sample. Thus, we may wrongly 
include job movers in our SIF-sample, which could understate the true degree of nominal 
wage rigidity. Second, we have precise information on total compensation per year but not on 
hours worked. Our measure of observed wage changes in the SIF-sample is, therefore, given 
by the changes in total compensation per year. Hence, temporary variations in hours, which 
arise, e.g., through different amounts of overtime in two years, look like a ‘wage change' in 
our sample. As we will illustrate below, this can generate a substantial number of observations 
that look like a wage cut but which are indeed reductions in actual hours worked. This is 
particularly important for the time period considered because in a recession firms may use 
working time reductions as an alternative to nominal cuts. Third, the available worker 
characteristics in the SIF-sample are not the same as in the SLFS. They include age, 
nationality, gender, details on the agency that recorded the payment and the period of time to 
which it applies.  
Figure 2 summarizes the distribution of nominal wage changes (measured in log wage 
differences) for job stayers in Switzerland between 1991 and 1997. Consider first the figure 
on the left which displays the histogram obtained from the SLFS. This histogram exhibits the 
following properties:  
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1. There is a spike at zero: The largest bin is the one containing no and small, but 
positive nominal wage changes (between zero and 2 percent).6  
2. There is an asymmetry in the distribution of wage changes. Negative wage changes are 
observed less frequently than positive wage changes. 
3. Despite the asymmetry there is a considerable fraction of negative wage changes. 
Compare this to the right panel of Figure 1a, which is based on the SIF data using identical 
bins. Three features deserve to be mentioned here:  
1. The SIF distribution exhibits less dispersion, i.e., it is more centered around zero than 
the SLFS distribution. While, e.g., 59 percent of all observations in the SIF are 
between zero and 10 percent, the corresponding figure for the SLFS is only 45 percent. 
2. The asymmetry between positive and negative wage changes is much more 
pronounced in the SIF sample. There is a striking discontinuity around zero and the 
pile-up of observations just above zero is very pronounced. 
3. The fraction of negative wage changes is considerably smaller in the SIF-sample.  
 
Table 2 provides additional information on wage changes in our two data sources together 
with the inflation rate (measured by CPI changes) and real GDP growth. The table shows that 
the sharp decrease in the rate of inflation at the beginning of the period considered is 
associated with more observed wage cuts and more zero wage changes in the SLFS. The 
fraction of job stayers with a zero nominal wage change rises from 5 percent in 1991 to 15 
percent in 1997. The fraction who reported wages that implied wage cuts is, in general, quite 
high. It also rises from 20 percent in 1991 to 33 percent in 1997. Interestingly, however, the 
fraction of workers with wage cuts is always lower in the SIF-sample than in the SLFS-
sample. This suggests that reporting error is important in the labor force survey: Imagine that 
the distribution of true wage changes has no, or only a few, negative entries. Assume further 
that reporting error is important. Then, as the distribution moves closer to zero over time, 
reporting error creates a larger number of negative observations. Therefore, we observe more 
wage cuts in the SLFS sample. Note that the fact that we cannot control for hours variation in 
the SIF sample only strengthens this argument because it is likely to produce false negatives 
in this sample, too, a point to which we return below. 
                                                 
6 For the exact fraction of zero wage changes see Table 2. 
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Figure 3 shows the evolution of the distribution of log wage differences over time, using the 
SIF sample. The sequence of distributions conveys the impression that the decline in inflation 
is associated with a rise in downward rigidity. Consider, first, the three panels for 1991, 1992, 
and 1993. In these years the distribution is – except for the small spike at zero - relatively 
symmetric around its median. The bins to the left and to the right of the median are of similar 
size. Compare this to the distribution of wage changes in the low inflation years 1995 to 1997, 
where the median is much closer to zero. In these years there is a sharp discontinuity at zero 
and the distribution also exhibits a pronounced asymmetry around zero. Note also that there is 
only a relatively small increase in the frequency of negative wage changes during these years.  
The upshot of the descriptive evidence in Table 2 and Figures 2 and 3 can be summarized as 
follows: The asymmetry in the distribution of wage changes and the spike at zero may be 
interpreted as an indication of nominal wage rigidity. Support for this interpretation is also 
provided by the fact that the asymmetry becomes much more pronounced over the years. 
However, the relatively large fraction of observed wage cuts in the SLFS and the SIF provide 
much less convincing evidence for nominal wage rigidity than the descriptive evidence from 
the personnel files. This raises the question whether the non-negligible number of observed 
wage cuts represent true wage cuts or whether they are mainly the result of reporting error (in 
the SLFS) or of unobserved hours variation (in the SIF). The much smaller number of 
observed wage cuts and the generally smaller dispersion of wage changes in the SIF suggests 
that reporting error is a serious problem in the SFLS.7 Thus, many of the observed wage cuts 
in the SLFS might be spurious. In addition, the absence of a direct measure for working time 
in the SIF may pollute the SIF data in a similar way as reporting error pollutes the SLFS data.  
In order to gain some insights into the potential role of unobserved variations in working time 
we take advantage of the fact that the personnel file of Firm B provides precise information on 
overtime payments for each individual. Thus, we can compute the distribution of wage 
changes in Firm B in the presence and in the absence of controlling for overtime payments. 
The results are presented in Figure 4. The first panel reproduces the true distribution of wage 
changes in Firm B, i.e., overtime payments are not included, for the period 1993 to 1998.8 In 
the second panel, we deliberately add overtime payments to the compensation to calculate 
'polluted' wage changes as we would observe them in the SIF. The distribution of 'wage' 
                                                 
7 The fact that the distribution of positive wage changes in the two firms above is much less dispersed than the 
distribution in the SLFS is also compatible with this conjecture. In both firms 89 percent of all observations are 
between zero and ten percent while in the SLFS only 45 percent of the observations are in this range.  
8 We constrain the sample, because information on overtime payments is only available for this period. 
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changes in the second panel now contains a sizeable fraction of spurious wage cuts (7.6 
percent) and is less centered around zero compared to the true distribution. While this exercise 
does not replicate the moments of the SIF-sample perfectly, it suggests that unobserved 
working time variations may well cause a sizable fraction of spurious wage cuts in the SIF-
sample. Note also that average wage growth is relatively high in Firm B, hence unobserved 
hours variation would generate even more false negatives in a low-growth firm.  
 
5.  An Empirical Model of Wage Changes  
The upshot of the previous discussion is that we need an econometric model that explicitly 
allows for the presence of measurement error so that one can separate true wage changes from 
wage changes that merely reflect reporting error or reductions in actual hours worked. The 
general idea behind our model is that there may be reasons – e.g., efficient nominal wage 
contracts, nominal fairness standards and nominal loss aversion – that render nominal wage 
cuts costly for the firms. Therefore, firms will not implement all desired wage cuts and, as a 
consequence, there will be a difference between the desired or “notional” wage cuts and 
actually implemented wage cuts. However, the larger the notional wage cut the more likely it 
is that the benefits will outweigh the costs. Hence, for individual i at time t there may exist a 
threshold value cit, which, together with the notional wage cut, determines whether the actual 
wage will be cut or not. If the notional wage cut is below cit the firm will not implement the 
cut but if the notional cut is above cit the pay reduction will be implemented. Our main focus 
is to estimate the mean µc and the variance σc of the distribution of thresholds. Since we also 
estimate the distribution of measurement errors and the distribution of notional wage changes 
we can compute the frequency of true wage cuts and the share of workers who is affected by 
nominal rigidity. Workers are affected by nominal rigidity if their notional wage change is 
negative but since the notional wage cut is below their threshold cit their actual wage is not 
cut. The general structure of the estimated model is as follows:  





−<+<+++
<+≤−
≥+++
=∆
itititititititit
itititit
ititititit
it
cebxebxmebx
ebxcm
ebxmebx
y
',0'if'
0'if
0'if'
   (1) 
where ity∆  is the observed log nominal wage change of individual i in period t, itit ebx +'  is 
the notional nominal wage change that would be implemented in the absence of downward 
nominal wage rigidity, itx  is a set of observable variables that are likely to affect wage 
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growth, ite  represents the usual error term, and itm  denotes the measurement error, which can 
be interpreted as reporting error in the SLFS and unobserved hours variation in the SIF.  
In the presence of nominal inertia and measurement error observed wage growth is not only 
determined by itit ebx +' . In addition, the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution 
of wage cut thresholds, µc and σc, and the standard deviation of mit, σm,are important. 
Therefore, observed wage changes can, in principle, fall into one of the following three 
regimes:  
(i) If the notional wage change itit ebx +'  is positive there are no forces that inhibit this wage 
change, i. e., we observe 'it it itx b e m+ +  in the data (see (1) above) and the likelihood of this 
occurring is 
( ' | ' 0)e m it it it itf y x b x b e+ ∆ − + >  
where ( )e mf + ⋅  is the density of the sum of e and m.  
(ii) If itit ebx +'  lies between -cit and zero, the firm will not cut the worker's wage but give him 
a pay freeze instead. The observed ‘wage change' is then entirely due to unobserved variation. 
Hence the likelihood of falling in this regime only depends on the distribution of m and is 
given by 
)0eb'xc|y(f ititititm <+<−∆  
Note that we do not assume that sufficiently small notional wage cuts result in a pay freeze. 
Whether a notional wage cut is executed or not depends on the distribution of cit, whose 
parameters are jointly estimated with all other parameters of the model.  
(iii) If the notional wage cut is larger than cit, the firm will implement the wage cut. The 
conditional density for this event is 
)0eb'x,ceb'x|b'xy(f itititititititme <+−<+−+ ∆  
Since it cannot be observed which regime generated a particular observation, the likelihood of 
an observation sums up to  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )0eb'x,ceb'xPr0eb'x,ceb'x|b'xyf
0eb'xcPr0eb'xc|yf
0eb'xPr0eb'x|b'xyfl
ititititititititititititme
itititititititm
ititititititmeit
<+−<+⋅<+−<+−+
<+<−⋅<+<−+
>+⋅>+−=
+
+
∆
∆
∆
(2) 
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We assume that e and m are i.i.d. normal and estimate the parameters by maximum 
likelihood.9  
Intuitively, our estimator examines whether individuals with low predicted real wage growth 
in high-inflation years have on average higher wage growth than expected (given their 
characteristics) during low-inflation years since the required nominal wage cut could not take 
place. This, together with the assumption of symmetric measurement error, identifies the 
extent of downward nominal wage rigidity. Notice that this identification is not biased 
towards finding downward nominal wage rigidity. If predicted versus actual wage growth in 
low-inflation years do not differ from predicted versus actual wage growth in high-inflation 
years, the estimator will conclude that there is no – or very little – downward nominal wage 
rigidity and leave this part of the model unidentified. 
Model (1) is similar to, but more general than, the model in Altonji and Devereux (1999). A 
main difference between our approach and the one taken by Altonji and Devereux is that we 
allow for individual heterogeneity in the thresholds cit whereas Altonji and Devereux impose 
the restriction that the threshold is the same for all workers. There is evidence (Shafir, 
Tversky and Diamond 1997; Fehr and Gächter 2000) indicating that individuals differ with 
regard to their fairness standards and their degree of money illusion. Thus, individual 
heterogeneity may be important so that some workers may have flexible wages while others 
have rigid wages. In our model, those workers who have a negative threshold (cit < 0) exhibit 
perfectly flexible wages. Note also that our model nests the model of Altonji and Devereux as 
a special case. If the variance of cit goes to zero the two models become identical.   
In addition to allowing for individual heterogeneity we also allow for a nonzero correlation 
between the error term ite  and the individual thresholds cit and we estimate the value of this 
correlation. This is potentially important because there is considerable survey evidence that 
nominal wage cuts do occur when a firm is in financial distress. Several studies (e.g., Bewley 
1999, Campbell and Kamlani 1997) document this. Individuals are more likely to accept wage 
cuts when their firm is in trouble. Allowing for a nonzero correlation between ite  and cit offers 
a simple way of incorporating this feature because changes in firm productivity are 
presumably an important component of ite . Based on the survey evidence one would, 
therefore, expect that if ite  is very low (negative) a worker’s threshold cit is very small, too, so 
that the correlation between ite  and cit is positive.  
                                                 
9 In an appendix, that is available on request, we derive the explicit expression for (2), that can be directly used 
for estimation purposes. 
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We also allow for some heterogeneity with regard to reporting error (in the SLFS) and 
overtime work (in the SIF sample). We assume that in every year, a fraction p (that will be 
estimated) of the individual data has no measurement error, but that the rest of the sample 
draws a normally distributed error. This means that in the SLFS a fraction p of all respondents 
states the correct income, but the rest makes normally distributed errors. In analogy, in the SIF 
sample, a fraction p of all individuals has no variation in hours between the previous and the 
current year. 
In our empirical estimates below it is important that itx  contains variables that capture 
business cycle variation in wages, and individual characteristics correlated with wage growth. 
We use the change in the regional unemployment rate as well as year fixed effects as our 
business cycle variables. Variables that systematically affect wage growth across workers,  are 
labor market experience, age, tenure, and observable skills of worker i. The inclusion of these 
variables into our wage growth equation is suggested by many papers (e.g., Topel 1991). It is 
generally recognized that the experience-earnings profile and the tenure-earnings profile is 
concave, i.e. wages grow at a decreasing rate with experience and tenure. Likewise, several 
studies indicate that wage growth is different for different categories of workers (e.g. Baker, 
Gibbs and Holmström 1994). As an additional control we also included the firm size.10 In our 
estimates with the SIF sample we use a worker’s age as a proxy for experience. In addition, a 
foreigner dummy variable, as well as an interaction term with log age, captures the systematic 
differences in experience and job status between Swiss employees and employees from other 
countries.  
Our approach nests both the case of perfect wage flexibility and the case of perfect wage 
rigidity. As µc approaches minus infinity, there is no downward wage rigidity. In this case the 
model collapses to a simple OLS regression of ity∆  where only the sum of e and m is 
identified. If, at the other extreme, µc is very large (and σc finite), there are no true wage cuts 
and the third regime drops out. Hence, the model nests both extreme cases, and any 
intermediate one. It allows for resistance only towards small wage cuts, or larger ones. It 
provides joint estimates of the distribution governing the cost cit of cutting nominal wages, 
and the variance of the distribution of e and m. If we estimate a negative µc that is very large 
in absolute value, most observed wage cuts represent true wage cuts. However, if we estimate 
large enough positive values of µc, most observed wage cuts do not represent true wage cuts, 
that is, measurement error is more pervasive. 
                                                 
10 A recent study by Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) reports firm-size effects for Switzerland that are 
comparable in size to those in the US.  
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Finally, our model also enables us to examine important determinants of µc (and σc). Instead 
of imposing the restriction (as in model (1)) that µc is the same for all workers in all years we 
can allow for year-specific µc's or for different µc's for different groups of workers. In 
particular, by estimating year-specific µc's we can observe whether µc is lower in low-inflation 
years, which would provide direct evidence for the validity of the conjecture put forward by 
Gordon (1996) and Mankiw (1996). Also, by allowing variations of µc across different 
categories of workers we can examine, for instance, whether µc is different for full-time and 
part-time workers or for job stayers and job movers. This question is important insofar as the 
role of fairness standards is presumably more relevant the stronger the attachment of workers 
to their firm. If this argument is true we should observe more wage rigidity for job stayers 
than job movers and for full-time workers compared to part-time workers.  
 
6. Results 
In this section, we discuss the results obtained by estimating the above model. We first 
present the overall tests for the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity. We then 
evaluate the stability of these estimates as inflation becomes very low. Next, we assess the 
implications of the model for different types of workers and the extent to which downward 
wage rigidity prevents real wage cuts. Finally, we examine the consequences of nominal wage 
rigidity for regional and industry-specific unemployment.  
 
6.1 Are Wages Flexible?  
The basic results for both samples are displayed in Table 3. For both samples we estimated 3 
different models. Model (1) estimates µc under the assumption that there is no heterogeneity 
in individual thresholds (σc = 0) and that the correlation between eit and cit, denoted by ρec, is 
zero. In model (2) we also allow for σc ≠ 0 and in model (3) we estimate both σc and ρec. In all 
regressions we control for year effects by including year-dummies and in the SLFS sample we 
also can control for firm size effects. The major result of Table 3 is that regardless of which 
data set we use and regardless of which model we take, the mean threshold µc is positive and 
significant indicating the existence of nominal wage rigidity. Moreover, in all models where 
we estimated σc the value of σc is significant so that a large percentage of individual 
thresholds is positive. In model (2) for the SIF sample, for instance, the mean threshold is 
0.383 and the standard deviation is 0.21 implying that only about 3 percent of all individuals 
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have no positive thresholds. Thus, only about 3 percent of the individuals have perfectly 
flexible wages whereas for 97 percent of the individuals nominal wages exhibit some rigidity. 
Moreover, according to model (2) 91 percent of the individuals have thresholds such that only 
if the notional wage cut is above 10 percent the actual wage will be cut. The quantitative 
importance of nominal wage rigidity is very similar, regardless of whether we use the 
estimates from the SLFS or the SIF, as can be seen in the remaining columns of Table 3. 
The relevance of nominal wage rigidity can be inferred from rows 4 and 5 of Table 3, which 
show the quantitative implications of the estimated distribution of thresholds for the frequency 
of true wage cuts and for the share of workers who would have experienced wage cuts in the 
absence of nominal rigidity. According to the estimates where σc is unconstrained (models (2) 
and (3)) the frequency of true wage cuts is between 7 and 8 percent in the SLFS sample and 
between 6 and 7 percent in the SIF sample. The share of workers who is affected by nominal 
rigidity, i. e., those who experience notional but not actual wage cuts, varies between 48 and 
54 percent. Thus, the quantitative importance of nominal rigidity is high and very robust 
across models and across data sets. Our estimates of model (3) also reveal that ρit is highly 
significant, positive and of the same size for both data sets. This is consistent with the view 
that negative idiosyncratic productivity shocks render people more willing to accept a nominal 
wage cut.  
The extent of measurement error in our survey data is substantial although it is lower than 
expected. Our estimate of the standard deviation σm of the measurement error in the SLFS-
sample is between 6 and 7 percent (see second page of Table 3). This is low compared to what 
validation studies of labor force surveys found for the US (see Angrist and Krueger, 1999 for 
a survey). The standard errors obtained from validation studies for the US are never below 10 
percent, and sometimes considerably larger. In the SIF-sample the measurement error due to 
overtime variations is between 3 and 4 percent. These numbers indicate that it is important to 
take measurement errors into account to generate a true picture of nominal wage rigidity. 
What are our estimates for the determinants of the notional wage changes? We find that a rise 
in experience lowers wage growth (see the estimates for the SLFS sample in Table 3). The 
estimated coefficient is negative and highly significant. Increasing labor market experience 
from one to ten years decreases wage growth by 2.7 percent. Table 3 also shows that a rise in 
tenure decreases wage growth. The tenure effect is roughly one third of the size of the 
experience effect. Note that these estimates of the tenure and the experience effect control for 
the potentially confounding impact of nominal wage rigidity because they take the truncation 
of wage changes below nominal zero (and above -cit) into account. Since our estimates of µc 
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and σc indicate a substantial amount of nominal inertia, estimates of the tenure and the 
experience effect that do not control for nominal inertia are likely to be confounded.11 Table 3 
also indicates that the position of workers in the firm’s hierarchy is important for wage 
growth. If the individual is a superior, wage growth is higher while if the individual is a 
member of the higher management wage growth is lower.12  
We also find evidence that the change in the regional unemployment rate causes a substantial 
reduction in nominal wage growth. Our estimates imply that a one percentage point increase 
in unemployment growth reduces wage growth by at least 0.7 percentage points in the SLFS 
sample and by 0.8 percentage points in the SIF. The estimates are thus very robust across 
samples and indicate that wages would be quite flexible in the absence of downward wage 
rigidity. We also experimented with the level of the regional unemployment rate in our 
regressions. However, while the change in the unemployment rate has a sizable and 
significant impact on wage growth, the coefficient of the unemployment rate is always rather 
small and insignificant. We would like to emphasize here that, if one does not control for the 
presence of downward rigidity, the effect of unemployment changes on wage changes is not 
significant: In OLS-regressions, that disregard the potential truncation of wage changes below 
nominal zero (and above -cit), the coefficient of unemployment changes is not significant, i.e., 
one is led to the wrong conclusion that unemployment growth does not affect wage growth. 
This shows the importance of taking into account the presence of nominal rigidity.  
For the SIF-sample we find that wage growth strongly declines with age as indicated by the 
negative and highly significant coefficient on log age. The SIF-estimates also shows that wage 
growth is smaller for foreign workers, reflecting most likely systematic differences in job 
status between Swiss and Non-Swiss employees. In addition, the positive coefficient on the 
interaction term between foreigner status and age indicates that wage growth declines less for 
Non-Swiss employees. We also conducted several regressions in which we included a gender 
dummy and interactions between gender and age (see Table A1 in the appendix). However, 
the inclusion of these control variables has little impact on the estimated distribution of 
thresholds.13  
                                                 
11 If we conduct OLS regressions not controlling for the presence of nominal wage rigidity, the tenure and the 
experience profiles are, in general, flatter.  
12 A superior is defined as an employee who has the power to direct the activities of several other employees 
without being a member of higher management.  
13 For the SLFS sample we also experimented with education variables. In the period under consideration their 
impact on wage growth was, however, insignificant and they did not change µc and σc. In view of the severe 
recession of the Swiss economy during this time it is not surprising that education had little impact on wage 
growth. The robustness of our estimates for µc and σc is also indicated by the striking similarity of the results 
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6.2 Are Nominal Rigidities Easily Malleable? 
This section examines whether nominal wage rigidity tends to vanish in the course of a period 
with persistently low nominal growth. A natural way to test for this is to estimate year-
specific distributions of wage cut thresholds. On the basis of this information we then can 
calculate the share of individuals displaying some nominal rigidity (i.e., cit > 0) and strong 
nominal rigidity (i.e., cit > 0.1). Remember that inflation declined from roughly five percent in 
1991 to zero percent in 1997. Real growth was slightly negative between 1991 and 1993 and 
slightly positive between 1994 and 1996. If nominal rigidity becomes weaker over time we 
should observe a declining impact of nominal rigidity. Table 4 provides our estimates of year-
specific values of µc and σc relative to the value of µc and σc in 1991. Table 4 also shows the 
percentage of workers exhibiting some (cit > 0) and strong (cit > 0.1) rigidity. Panels (a) and 
(b) in Figure 5 present the corresponding graphs.14 It is remarkable that all estimates of µc are 
positive and highly significant. For the SIF sample the share of individuals displaying strong 
rigidity is rather stable over the years and fluctuates between 88 and 92 percent (see Table 4 
and Panel b in Figure 5). For the SLFS sample the share declines from 92 to 82 percent 
between 1991 and 1996. In, 1997 the share is again at 92 percent (see Table 4 and Panel a in 
Figure 5). However, the overall prevalence of downward nominal wage rigidity (the fraction 
of individuals with cit > 0) decreases somewhat from almost 100 percent to about 90 percent, 
in both the SLFS and the SIF sample. 
To see whether this was enough to eliminate, or substantially reduce, the impact of downward 
nominal wage rigidity, we calculate the frequency of wage freezes and wage cuts for every 
year. The results are presented panels (c) and (d) in Figure 5. Irrespective of the data source, 
we get the same picture: There is essentially no or only a minor increase in the frequency of 
true wage cuts during the sample period and the share of workers who did not receive wage 
cuts due to nominal wage rigidity rises sharply in both samples. Thus,  the small reduction in 
the resistance against wage cuts was not nearly large enough to lead to a meaningful increase 
                                                                                                                                                         
obtained from the SIF and the SLFS. In addition, the results in Table A1 in the appendix, where we interact the 
age profile fully with nationality and gender suggest that our estimates are rather stable. The results in columns 
(2) and (3) of Table A1 (in particular, the frequency of wage cuts and the share of workers experiencing wage 
freezes) are very close to the baseline results where we omit gender and most of these interactions.  
14 Recall that the SLFS is based on May-to-May data. Hence, we use May-to-May changes in the CPI measure of 
inflation. Analogously, we use December-to-December CPI changes whenever we use the SIF data. Therefore, 
inflation rates differ somewhat between panel (a) and (b) of Figure 5. 
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in the number of nominal wage cuts. Quite to the contrary, the share of workers with wage 
freezes becomes twice as large during the period under consideration.  
 
6.3 Who is most affected? 
There are various reasons why nominal rigidity is likely to be different for different categories 
of workers. First, fairness standards that render nominal wage cuts costly are likely to arise 
through a history of repeated interactions between the worker and the firm. In the absence of 
such a history employers are less likely to be constrained by fairness standards. Therefore, it 
seems much easier to impose pay cuts on job movers than on job stayers. Second, for a firm 
the loyalty and work morale of full-time workers is, in general, more important than the 
loyalty and work morale of part-time workers. Moreover, the relevance of fairness standards 
is likely to be more important for workers with a greater attachment to the firm. Therefore, 
one would expect more wage rigidity among full-time workers. A third reason is related to the 
theory of efficient nominal wage contracts (MacLeod and Malcomson 1993). These contracts 
serve the purpose to protect the relation-specific investments of firms and workers efficiently. 
They are therefore more important for those workers who have more firm-specific human 
capital. Job stayers have, by definition, more firm-specific human capital than job movers. In 
addition, it seems likely that full-time workers have more specific human capital than part 
time workers so that efficient nominal wage contracts are more important for full-time 
workers. Therefore, the theory of efficient nominal wage contracts also suggests that nominal 
wage rigidity is more important for job stayers and for full-time workers.  
The results regarding the differences between full-time and part time job stayers are displayed 
in Table 5. As argued above we find large differences between the two groups of employees. 
For part-time job stayers, the estimated mean threshold µc is 0.2 whereas for full-time job 
stayers it is 0.987 (see Table 5). Together with the estimated standard deviations this 
difference translates into sizeable differences of the impact of wage rigidity. For instance, 
only 6.8 percent of the full-time job stayers experience wage cuts while 15.5 percent of part-
time job stayers had to accept wage cuts (see row 5 in Table 5). Likewise, for 57.2 percent of 
the full-time job stayers nominal wage rigidity constitutes a binding constraint, that is, there 
wages would have been cut in the absence of nominal rigidity, whereas this is the case for 
only 48 percent of part-time job stayers.  
A similar picture emerges with regard to the difference between job stayers and job movers 
(see Table 5). Job stayers have a much larger average threshold, the frequency of true wage 
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cuts is much smaller for them (8.4 percent versus 20.6 percent for job movers), and the share 
of workers for whom nominal rigidity is binding is much larger for job stayers (55.2 percent 
versus 40.6 percent). Thus, taken together, the evidence in this section is consistent with the 
above arguments that predict differences in nominal rigidity across these groups of workers. 
This lends support to the view that fairness standards and efficient nominal wage contracts are 
relevant factors behind the rigidity of nominal wages. 
 
6.4 The Consequences of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity 
Our estimates provide two further pieces of information. First, we can calculate the average 
notional wage cut itit ebx +'  that did not occur because -cit < itit ebx +'  ≤ 0  holds. For brevity, 
we call this the average prevented wage cut and denote it by ( )0wc|wE it*itit* ≤<− ∆∆ , where 
*
itw∆  ≡ itit ebx +' . Second, we can compute a measure of the average wage sweep-up due to 
downward wage rigidity *( )it itE w w∆ − ∆  where itw∆  is the true wage change. The average 
wage sweep-up can be interpreted as the increase in average labor costs due to downward 
rigidity of nominal wages. If this interpretation is correct a rise in the average wage sweep-up 
should be associated with a rise in unemployment or a decline in employment in the different 
industries and cantons.   
Panels (e) and (f) in Figure 5 exhibit the evolution of ( )0| ** <∆<−∆ ititit wcwE  for the job 
stayers. The panels show that downward nominal wage rigidity has less impact at the 
beginning of the period considered when inflation was still relatively high. At this time the 
prevented wage cut was roughly 2 percent in both data sets. This changes substantially in 
years where inflation rates are closer to zero. From 1993 onwards, the prevented wage 
reductions are, on the average, 5 percent or more. This shows again that nominal rigidity 
became increasingly important during the period of low nominal growth.  
We now turn to the question whether downward nominal wage rigidity has consequences for 
the real side of the economy. For this purpose we compute the average wage sweep up 
*( )it itE w w∆ − ∆ for every canton and every industry and relate them to the unemployment rate 
in the cantons and the industries.15 Since there are large variations in the level and in the 
changes of unemployment across cantons and across industries it is interesting to examine to 
                                                 
15 In the following presentation (which is based on the SIF-sample) we concentrate on the relation between 
average wage sweep-up and the unemployment rate. However, the changes in the unemployment rate in our 
sample are almost exclusively driven by the changes in the employment level because labor supply was roughly 
constant. Therefore our examination also provides direct insights into the relation between employment and 
average wage sweep-ups across cantons and industries.  
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what extent variations in the wage sweep-up can explain these variations in unemployment. 
Note that in our estimate of the wage sweep-up the rate of unemployment is not an 
explanatory variable. This is important because otherwise there would be a relation between 
wage sweep-up and unemployment by construction.16  
In Figure 6a we plotted the relation between average wage sweep-up and unemployment rate 
separately for each canton with more than 1 percent of the labor force17. The figure conveys a 
striking message: In each canton we can observe an unambiguous positive relation between 
the wage sweep-up and the unemployment rate. In addition to Figure 6a we also ran the 
following regression:  
 ( ) jt*jtjt ewwbE.constu +−+= ∆∆  (3) 
where ujt is the rate of unemployment in canton j and year t, and Ejt(.) denotes the average 
wage sweep up in canton j and year t. The results of this regression are presented in Panel A 
of Table 6. In the first column, we estimate equation (3). The OLS estimate of (3) yields a 
highly significant and large positive point estimate of 1.17 for b: A one percent increase in the 
wage sweep-up increases unemployment by 1.17 percentage points. The R2 of regression (3) 
indicates that variations in the wage sweep-up alone explain 49 percent of the variance in the 
unemployment rate. In the second to fourth column, we add cantonal and year fixed effects in 
a stepwise manner. The point estimate for b remains almost unchanged and is again highly 
significant when we add cantonal fixed effects that control for permanent regional differences 
in labor market conditions. Hence, our result is not driven by permanent regional differences 
that affect the unemployment rate and the wage sweep-up simultaneously. In the third column, 
we add year fixed effects. The point estimate of b is again significant and positive. The size 
and the standard error of b is now higher. That b remains positive and significant means that 
the estimate of b is not just driven by year effects that affect the wage sweep-up and the 
unemployment rate simultaneously. In fact, as can be seen from the R2 in the third column, the 
year fixed effects do not add much to the explanation of unemployment, once one controls for 
the wage sweep-up. They mainly blow up the standard error of the estimate. The two point 
estimates of b in the first and third column are therefore not significantly different. In our 
                                                 
16 Remember (from section 6.1) that the level of the unemployment rate does not affect notional wage changes. 
Instead, notional changes are affected by labor market experience, tenure, unemployment growth, age, etc. The 
differences in these variables across cantons and industries determine, together with our estimate of µc and σc, 
the different wage sweep-ups in cantons and industries. Note also that the correlation between cantonal 
(industry) unemployment rates and cantonal (industry) unemployment growth is negligible (-0.01 for the cantons 
and 0.13 for the industries). Hence, the cantonal (industry) wage sweep-ups can be used as an independent 
variable in the explanation of cantonal (industry) unemployment rates.  
17 For the other cantons we have too few data to get useful estimates. In total we lose less than 2 percent of all 
observations by excluding the small cantons. 
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strictest specification, in the fourth column, we add year and cantonal fixed effects to the 
regression and find that the point estimate of b is still positive and highly significant. 
In Figure 6b we plotted the relation between unemployment rate and wage sweep-up for each 
industry. Again the same picture emerges. In almost every industry the increase in the wage 
sweep-up is associated with an increase in the unemployment rate. Interestingly, however, the 
steepness of this relation varies considerably across industries. While, e.g., the relation is very 
steep in tourism and construction, it is less steep in the banking and the insurance sector. 
Analogously to the regression for the cantons above we also conducted a regression for the 
industries. Panel B of Table 6 reports the result of this regression. In all specifications the 
wage sweep up has a sizeable and significant impact on industry unemployment. Interestingly, 
the size of b in Panel B is quantitatively quite similar to the estimated size of b in Panel A.  
Thus, Figures 6a and 6b and the results in Table 6 show that variations in unemployment rates 
across cantons and industries are strongly related to the corresponding variations in wage 
sweep-ups caused by nominal rigidity. This represents strong evidence that in the low growth-
low inflation environment, which characterized the Swiss economy in the 1990s nominal 
wage rigidity had negative employment effects.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
It has been argued that in a macro-environment with persistently low nominal GDP growth 
the downward rigidity of nominal wages will vanish. Workers will become accustomed to 
more frequent nominal wage cuts and employers will, therefore, not shy away from cutting 
nominal pay. If this argument is valid nominal wage rigidity would be largely irrelevant 
because in an environment with high nominal growth rates there is little need to cut nominal 
pay to achieve real wage adjustments while in a low-growth environment nominal rigidity 
would be absent.  
This paper uses three different data sources to examine this conjecture for the Swiss situation 
between 1991 and 1997. During this time Switzerland went through a unique macro economic 
phase with negative or very low real GDP growth and a rapidly declining rate of inflation. All 
three data sources used in our paper show that nominal wage rigidity also persists in periods 
of low nominal growth. According to the personnel files of two firms wage cuts almost never 
occur. The data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey indicate that at most 8 percent of the job 
stayers receive wage cuts while nominal rigidity prevents wage cuts for 50 or more percent of 
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the job stayers. The data from the Social Insurance Files suggest even fewer wage cuts. Our 
estimates also show that the impact of nominal rigidity does not decline in this period of 
sustained low nominal GDP growth. While there was a tiny increase in the fraction of 
employees willing to take wage cuts, this increase was far too small to accommodate the 
greater need for wage cuts. The fraction of workers whose wages are not cut because of 
nominal rigidity increases considerably over time while the frequency of true wage cuts is 
roughly constant. This indicates that, although the downward pressure on nominal wages 
increased over time, the downward rigidity of nominal wages remained a binding constraint 
for many employees. Moreover, the relatively large coefficient on the unemployment change 
in our wage growth equation suggests that in the absence of nominal rigidity wages would be 
quite flexible.  
Theories of nominal wage rigidity that are based on the existence of efficient nominal 
contracts or on nominal fairness standards in repeated work relations predict that the wages of 
job movers show less rigidity than the wages of job stayers. These theories also suggest that 
the wages of part-time workers exhibit less rigidity than the wages of full-time workers. Our 
results confirm these predictions and lend thus support to these theories. 
Our examination also suggests that nominal wage rigidity has important macroeconomic 
effects in an environment with low real growth and low inflation. The wage sweep-up due to 
nominally rigid wages explains a large part of the variations in the rate of unemployment 
across industries and across cantons: The higher the wage sweep-up the higher is the 
unemployment rate. This lends support to the view that the downward rigidity of nominal 
wages is sufficiently strong to cause an increase in real labor costs and a decrease in 
employment.  
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TABLE A1: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS SIF SAMPLE  - ML ESTIMATES 
 
 
 
SOCIAL INSURANCE FILES 
CANTONAL SAMPLEC 
 
SOCIAL INSURANCE FILES 
INDUSTRY SAMPLEC 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
       
0.383** 0.393** 1.118** 0.373** 0.376** 0.908**Mean Threshold of 
cutting wages cµ  
 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.068) (0.011) (0.012) (0.045) 
Standard Deviation cσ  
(Conditional Standard 
Deviation when 0≠ecρ ) 
0.21** 
(0.01) 
0.22** 
(0.01) 
0.544 
(0.035) 
0.195**
(0.012) 
0.196** 
(0.012) 
0.401**
(0.031) 
Correlation with 
idiosyncratic wage 
change eit: ecρ  
 
Zero Zero 0.541**
(0.068) 
Zero Zero 0.529**
(0.055) 
 
Implied Frequency of 
Nominal Wage Cuts 
 
0.071 
 
0.071 
 
0.06 
 
0.06 
 
0.06 
 
0.051 
 
Fraction of Workers 
affected by Nominal 
Wage Rigidities  
 
0.542 
 
0.542 
 
0.499 
 
0.536 
 
0.537 
 
0.497 
       
-.008** -.009** -.009* -.01** -.01** -.009** Change in regional / 
industry Unemployment 
Rate 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
-1.15** -1.55** -1.64** -1.63** -1.96** -2.08** Log(Age) 
 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.088) (0.053) (0.073) (0.075) 
0.146** 0.197** 0.208** 0.209** 0.253** 0.269**Log2(Age) 
 
 
(0.008) (0.01) (0.012) (0.007) (0.01) (0.01) 
-0.07** -.488* -0.49* -0.1** -0.70** -0.73** Foreigner (dummy 
variable) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.249) (0.253) (0.018) (0.218) (0.22) 
Female (dummy variable) -- -1.27** 
(0.214) 
 
-1.33** 
(0.215) 
-- -1.08** 
(0.2) 
-1.23** 
(0.201) 
Foreign×Log(Age) 0.019**
(0.006) 
0.247 
(0.138) 
 
0.249**
(0.141) 
-- 0.361** 
(0.121) 
0.378**
(0.123) 
Foreigner×Log2(Age) -- -0.03 
(0.019) 
 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-- -.046** 
(0.016) 
-.049** 
(0.017) 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE  
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Female×Log(Age) -- 0.642**
(0.119) 
 
0.676**
(0.12) 
-- 0.54** 
(0.112) 
0.616**
(0.113) 
Female×Log2(Age) -- -.079** 
(0.017) 
-.083** 
(0.016) 
-- -0.07** 
(0.016) 
-0.08** 
(0.016) 
       
0.115 0.129 0.127 0.125 0.124 0.121 σ e 
      
σ m 
 
0.033 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.034 
P 
 
0.344 0.363 0.371 0.272 0.281 0.279 
 
Year Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of  
Observations 
 
58,297 
 
58,297 
 
58,297 
 
55,884 
 
55,884 
 
55,884 
 
Log likelihood 
 
 
44,770 
 
44,907 
 
45,103 
 
49,433 
 
49,552 
 
49,706 
 
Notes: a. standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering on cantons and years. *, ** 
denotes significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. 
 b. σe and σm denote the standard deviation of eit and mit, respectively. 
 c. Some agencies only enroll individuals from a particular canton. Individuals enrolled 
in these agencies form the 'cantonal' sample (N=58,297). Other agencies only enroll 
employees from a particular industry (the 'industry' sample, N=55,884). 
 
  
 
TABLE 1: NOMINAL GDP GROWTH DURING THE SAMPLE YEARS 
 
 
NUMBER OF CONSECUTIVE YEARS 
BELOW 
 
 
 
 
YEARS 
CONSIDERED 
 
MEDIAN 
5.2 PERCENTa 2.6 PERCENT 
   
A. PREVIOUS STUDIES (UNITED STATES)     
Card and Hyslop (1996) 1976 – 1991 8.1% 0 0 
McLaughlin (1994) 1976 – 1986 11.3% 0 0 
Kahn (1997) 1971 – 1988 8.9% 0 0 
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) 1959 – 1995 7.6% 2 0 
Altonji and Devereux (1999) 1972 – 1992 7.7% 0 0 
Lebow, Saks and Wilson (1999) 
 
1981 - 1998 5.7% 0 0 
B. THIS STUDY (SWITZERLAND) 
 
1991 – 1997 2.2% All Years 6 
Sources: Economic Report of the President 2000, Table B-3; Swiss National Bank Monthly 
Bulletin; own calculations.  
Notes:  a. The highest nominal GDP growth rate in Switzerland was 5.2 percent in 1991. 
 
  
 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF WAGE FREEZES AND WAGE CUTS  
 
 
    
SOURCE: SWISS LABOR FORCE SURVEY 
 
 
SOURCE: SOCIAL INSURANCE FILES 
YEAR 
 
 
 
RATE OF 
INFLATION 
(CPI) 
REAL GDP 
GRWOTH 
FRACTION WITH 
ZERO NOMINAL 
WAGE CHANGE
FRACTION WITH 
NOMINAL WAGE 
DECREASE 
 
N 
FRACTION WITH 
ZERO NOMINAL 
PAY CHANGE 
FRACTION WITH 
NOMINAL PAY 
DECREASE 
 
N 
         
1991 4.7% -0.8% 0.05 0.20 2,941 0.02 0.11 18,450 
         
1992 3.7% -0.1% 0.08 0.29 3,337 0.02 0.15 20,087 
         
1993 1.1% -0.5% 0.09 0.31 3,476 0.03 0.20 20,870 
         
1994 1.6% 0.5% 0.06 0.31 3,379 0.05 0.21 20,699 
         
1995 0.9% 0.5% 0.06 0.31 2,606 0.04 0.25 19,556 
         
1996 
 
0.6% 0.3% 0.14 0.38 2,742 0.05 0.26 20,285 
1997 
 
0% 1.7% 0.15 0.33 2,754 0.09 0.31 20,681 
Sources: Federal Office of Statistics, Swiss Labour Force Survey 1991 – 1998, Social Insurance Files 1990 - 1997; own calculations. 
  
TABLE 3: THE EXTENT OF NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITIES  - ML ESTIMATES 
 
 
 
SWISS LABOR FORCE SURVEY 
 
SOCIAL INSURANCE FILES 
 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
       
.268** 0.513** 12.01* .208** 0.383** 0.89** Mean Threshold for 
wage cuts cµ  
 
 
(.006) (0.06) (5.34) (.002) (0.01) (0.03) 
Standard Deviation cσ  
(Conditional Standard 
Deviation when 0≠ecρ ) 
Zeroc 0.358**
(0.04) 
7.19* 
(3.14) 
Zeroc 0.21** 
(0.01) 
0.441**
(0.025) 
Correlation of cit with 
idiosyncratic wage 
change eit: ecρ  
 
Zerod Zerod 0.52** 
(0.074) 
Zerod Zerod 0.48** 
(0.025) 
 
Implied Frequency of 
Nominal Wage Cuts 
 
0.023 
 
0.08 
 
0.069 
 
0.047 
 
0.071 
 
0.063 
 
 
Share of Workers 
affected by Nominal 
Wage Rigidities  
 
0.556 
 
0.522 
 
0.483 
 
0.48 
 
0.542 
 
0.494 
 
       
      
-.012** -.017** -.02** - - - Log Experience 
(.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002)    
-.005** -0.004* -0.004* - - - Log Tenure 
(.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002)    
Individual has 
subordinates 
.029** 
(.006) 
0.031**
(0.007) 
0.032**
(0.007) 
- - - 
(dummy variable) 
 
      
Individual is member  
of higher management 
-.01** 
(.003) 
-.011** 
(0.003) 
-.013** 
(0.004) 
- - - 
(dummy variable)        
-.007* -.007* -.0082* -.008** -.008** -.008** Change in regional 
Unemployment Rate 
 
(.004) (0.003) (0.004) (.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
- - - -1.12** -1.15** -1.21** Log(Age) 
 
 
   (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
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- - - 0.132** 0.146** 0.154**Log2(Age) 
 
 
   (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
- - -  -0.07** -0.07** Foreigner (dummy 
variable) 
 
    (0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
Foreigner*Log(Age) 
 
- - -  0.019**
(0.006) 
0.018**
(0.006) 
0.121 0.118 0.137 0.113 0.115 0.139 σ e 
      
σ m 
 
0.073 0.058 0.061 0.041 0.033 0.033 
 p 
 
0.394 0.424 0.418 0.33 0.344 0.341 
 
Year Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Firm-Size Effect 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Number of  
Observations 
 
21,144 
 
21,144 
 
21,144 
 
58,297 
 
58,297 
 
58,297 
 
Log likelihood 
 
 
8,330 
 
8,513 
 
8,530 
 
43,221 
 
44,770 
 
44,904 
 
Notes: a. standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering on cantons and years. *, ** 
denotes significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. 
 b. σe and σm denote the standard deviation of eit and mit, respectively. 
 c. Model with cσ = 0 corresponds to the model estimated in Altonji and Devereux 
(1999).  
 d. Correlation of cit with idiosyncratic wage change eit is restricted to zero.  
  
 
TABLE 4: THRESHOLD WAGE CUT OVER TIME   
ML ESTIMATES 
 
 
 
SWISS LABOR FORCE SURVEY 
 
SOCIAL INSURANCE FILES 
  
Parameters of the 
cit-distribution 
 
 
Share of 
individuals 
displaying  
 
 
Parameters of the 
cit-distribution 
 
 
Share of 
individuals 
displaying  
 
 
cµ  
 
cσ  
Somec 
rigidity
Strongd 
rigidity
 
cµ  
 
cσ  
Somec 
rigidity 
Strongd 
rigidity
 
 
        
1991 
 
0.22# 
(0.017) 
0.091# 
(0.03) 
0.99 0.92 0.17# 
(0.007)
0.06# 
(0.002) 
 
0.99 0.88 
1992 0.40#,** 0.27#,** 0.93 0.87 0.22#,** 0.10#,** 0.99 0.89 
         
1993 0.48#,** 0.29#,** 0.94 0.89 0.39#,** 0.23#,** 0.96 0.91 
         
1994 0.59#,* 0.44#,** 0.91 0.87 0.45#,** 0.25#,** 0.96 0.92 
         
1995 0.49# 0.43#,** 0.87 0.81 0.41#,** 0.22#,** 0.97 0.92 
         
1996 1.38# 1.39#,** 0.84 0.82 0.43#,** 0.26#,** 0.95 0.90 
         
1997 0.54#,** 0.30#,** 0.96 0.92 0.57#,** 0.38#,** 0.93 0.89 
 
 
        
 
Number of 
Observations 
 
21,144 
    
58,297 
   
 
Log 
likelihood 
 
8,544 
    
44,994 
   
         
Notes:  a. standard errors for 1991 are in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering on cantons 
and years. To preserve spaces, all standard errors except those for 1991 have 
been suppressed. # denotes significant difference from zero at the five percent 
level. *, ** denotes significant difference relative to the estimate in 1991 at the 5 
percent and 1 percent level respectively.  
b. Same specification as in Table 3, column (1).  
c. Some rigidity is defined by a positive threshold for wage cuts (cit > 0). 
d. Strong rigidity is defined by a threshold wage cut of cit > 0.1. 
 
  
TABLE 5: NOMINAL RIGIDITIES FOR DIFFERENT GROUPS OF WORKERS   
ML ESTIMATES FROM SWISS LABOR FORCE SURVEY, 1991 – 1997 
 FULL-TIME VS.  
PART-TIME WORK 
JOB STAYERS VS.  
JOB MOVERS 
 
 
 
Full-Time  
Job Stayers 
 
Part-Time  
Job Stayers 
 
Job Stayers 
 
Job Movers 
     
Mean Threshold for Wage 
Cuts cµ  
0.987** 
(0.03) 
0.20** 
(0.06) 
0.644** 
(0.04) 
0.098** 
(0.01) 
     
Standard Deviation of 
Threshold Distribution cσ  
0.69** 
(0.02) 
0.155** 
(0.02) 
0.465** 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
 
 
    
Share of Individuals 
Displaying  
    
     
Some nominal rigidityc 0.923 0.905 0.917 0.917 
     
Strong nominal rigidityd 0.901 0.748 0.879 0.487 
     
Frequency of Wage 
Freezes and Wage Cuts 
    
     
Frequency of Wage Cuts 0.068 0.155 0.084 0.206 
     
Frequency of Wage 
Freezes 
0.572 0.48 0.552 0.406 
     
     
0.139  0.145  σ e 
     
σ m 0.058  0.059  
 
Number of Observations 
 
21,144 
  
22,971 
 
 
Log likelihood 
 
 
8,513 
 
  
8,929 
 
Notes:  a. standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering on cantons and years. 
*, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively.  
b. Same specification as in Table 3, column (2).  
c. Some rigidity is defined by a positive threshold wage cut (cit > 0). 
d. Strong rigidity is defined by a threshold wage cut of cit > 0.1. 
  
 
TABLE 6: THE REAL EFFECTS OF DOWNWARD NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY 
 
OLS REGRESSIONS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 1991 - 1997 
 
  
A. UNEMPLOYMENT ACROSS 17 LARGEST CANTONS 
 
 ( )*wwE jt ∆−∆  
 
1.17*** 
(0.10) 
 
 
1.11*** 
(0.09) 
 
2.24*** 
(0.88) 
 
1.69*** 
(0.44) 
 
R2 
 
0.49 
 
 
0.90 
 
0.56 
 
0.95 
Cantonal Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
     
  
B. UNEMPLOYMENT ACROSS 16 LARGEST INDUSTRIES 
 
 ( )*wwE jt ∆−∆  
 
0.98*** 
(0.19) 
 
0.91*** 
(0.17) 
 
 
1.90*** 
(0.65) 
 
1.69*** 
(0.56) 
 
R2 
 
0.27 
 
 
0.85 
 
0.33 
 
0.89 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Notes:  a)  standard errors, adjusted for clustering on cantons or industry respectively, in 
parentheses. 
b) *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
c) N = 119 canton and year cells in Panel A, and N=112 industry and year cells in 
Panel B. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Nominal Wage Changes
Evidence from Personnel Files
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Figure 2: Distribution of Nominal Wage Changes
Evidence from Representative Samples, Switzerland 1991 - 1997
Swiss Labor Force Survey (N=21,144)
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Figure 3: Distribution of Wage Changes over Time
Evidence from Social Insurance Files
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Figure 4: True and Polluted Wage Changes
Evidence from Personnel Files, Firm B, 1993 - 1998
True Hourly Wage Changes
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FIGURE 5: ARE NOMINAL RIGIDITIES FADING?
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Figure 6a: Unemployment rate and Wage Sweep-Up across Cantons
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Figure 6b: Unemployment rate and Wage Sweep-Up across Industries
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